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the Bill of Rights should prevent: "[h]eresy trials are foreign to our 
Constitution, "23 and there is nothing more erosive of the spiritual 
fabric of American public law than to exile any group from the ba-
sic rights of all Americans on the ground that their beliefs, or 
speech, or way of life is a heresy to the true American tradition. We 
need to be more, not less, sensitive to the constitutional claims of 
homosexuals today precisely because they are unjustly targeted as 
vulnerable political exiles from the constitutional community of 
equal rights under law.24 
SUING THE PRESS. By Rodney A. Smolla.t New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 277. $19.95. 
Mark Silverstein 2 
Rarely is a Supreme Court decision greeted as enthusiastically 
as was New York Times v. Sullivan. For years, Supreme Court dicta 
had placed libel and slander outside the protection of the first 
amendment, leaving the print and broadcast media subject to poten-
tially huge libel judgments under the vagaries of state libel laws. 
Concluding that a rule of law that required newspapers to guarantee 
the truth of all assertions inhibited public debate, the Court in New 
York Times held that the first amendment bars public officials from 
recovering damages for defamatory statements without proof that 
the challenged statements were made with knowledge of their falsity 
or with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false. In 
repudiating the old doctrine of seditious libel and proclaiming the 
free and unfettered exchange of ideas to be the hallmark of a society 
dedicated to self-government, the Court won overwhelming ap-
proval for a decision considered by knowledgeable observers to be 
an important step toward the ideal of an open and democratic soci-
ety. Moreover, the decision appeared to herald the emergence of 
the media, the federal courts and the black civil rights movement as 
a powerful coalition destined to change the very nature of American 
politics. Hence the decision in New York Times not only national-
ized the libel laws of the fifty states in the name of more effective 
self-government, but it also symbolized the dynamic political and 
social changes of the 1960s. Small wonder that as astute a critic as 
23. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (Douglas, J., writing for the Court). 
24. I develop this argument at greater length in Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Privacy, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
I. Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
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Harry Kalven characterized New York Times as potentially "the 
best and most important opinion [the Court] has ever produced in 
the realm of freedom of speech."J 
Two decades later, unanimous praise has turned to universal 
displeasure; everyone, it seems, is unhappy with the current state of 
American libel law. The public, distrustful or even contemptuous 
of the media, punishes media defendants in libel cases through gi-
gantic damage awards. Although many of these verdicts are re-
versed or reduced on appeal, the media assert that the verdicts 
inhibit robust debate. Public officials and public figures, however, 
protest the heavy burden they face in protecting personal reputation 
and privacy against the onslaught of what they regard as increas-
ingly irresponsible media. The dissatisfaction extends to the 
Supreme Court where at least two Justices have called for reexami-
nation of the New York Times standard.4 Given all these criticisms, 
one might conclude that the only interest currently served by the 
law of libel is that of the lawyers who profit from the multiplicity of 
libel actions. 
Drawing from a host of recent cases, Professor Rodney Smolla 
attempts to make sense of the complexities of libel law and litiga-
tion. With a cast of characters ranging from Jerry Falwell to Henry 
Kissinger to Elizabeth Taylor, the book is lively reading and, at the 
same time, an important and informative discussion of the law of 
defamation. Making legal doctrine accessible to a wide audience is 
no small accomplishment, particularly in an area as arcane as defa-
mation, and Professor Smolla has accomplished this feat in grand 
style. 
Professor Smolla's goals, however, extend beyond mere de-
scription; not only does he seek to tell us what transpired in the 
years following New York Times; he also wants to explain why 
those developments took place. The national fascination with libel 
cases, he writes, "is worth studying for what it reveals about current 
American culture, and for what it reveals about the influences of 
cultural trends on the fabric and workings of the American legal 
system." What caused the apparent rise in libel actions? What do 
plaintiffs hope to accomplish? What accounts for the huge verdicts 
delivered by many juries? Are journalistic practices or subjects so 
different from those of previous generations? Has America become, 
as Smolla puts it, "too thin-skinned?" In light of the fact that every 
3. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191, 194. 
4. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 764, 767 (1985) (Bur-
ger, C.J. and White, J., concurring). 
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week seems to bring forth yet another libel suit in which the rich or 
famous (or both) confront the corporate media in a battle to the 
death that has become America's newest spectator sport, the ques-
tions posed by Smolla appear ripe for scholarly analysis. 
Smolla's premise is "that the evolution of American law is al-
ways much more deeply influenced by changing cultural moods 
than by changes in technical legal doctrine." In locating the prime 
source of legal development outside of the law, Smolla is following 
the lead of a host of distinguished scholars. It is a more sophisti-
cated and more exciting endeavor than narrowly doctrinal analysis. 
But it is also more likely to go astray, when an author imagines 
causal chains that are vague or unconvincing. Professor Smolla 
does not always avoid this danger. Consider, for example, this ex-
planation of the proliferation of libel suits: 
[T]he greater sensitivity to injuries inflicted by the media is a manifestation of the 
best shared values between those who fought in Vietnam for "duty, honor and 
country" and those who lived through the Vietnam era protesting the war and who 
emerged later looking for some deep psychic peace. What the two groups appear to 
share is a conviction that human beings are more than their visible parts, more than 
the material aggregate of their bodies, their property and their bank statements. 
The heart of the matter for William Westmoreland, and for sympathetic juries in 
other libel suits across the United States, may have been that in some circumstances 
the libel suit provides one of the last hopes for vindicating one's dignity and for 
preventing an impersonal corporate media from assuming the big brother role that 
Americans so often fear from government. 
We may grant that the libel explosion in the United States tells us a 
good deal about developments in American culture, yet doubt that 
it tells us quite this much. 
Overblown statements aside, Smolla is correct in stressing that 
traditional structures and patterns of authority in the United States 
are changing, precipitating a crisis of confidence in the body poli-
tic.s The growth in libel litigation is one manifestation of this devel-
opment. Polls reveal that many Americans consider the media to 
be biased and inaccurate. Many believe that the "news" has be-
come a blend of fact and entertainment produced by impersonal 
divisions of huge corporate conglomerates. Smolla asserts that a 
growing public perception that the mainstream media exercise great 
power without public accountability produces, at the very least, a 
subconscious desire on the part of media's victims to attempt to 
redress that balance. In short, Smolla sees libel litigation as one 
battleground in which individuals seek to reassert human values in 
5. A fascinating description of this crisis of confidence appears in M. LEVIN, TALK 
RADIO AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1987). 
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a cold, impersonal, corporate world. That may not be the last word 
on modem libel law, but it is a good beginning. 
POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: ESSAYS ON THE FRONTIER OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY. By Arthur S. Miller.' Westport, Ct.: 
Greenwood Press. 1985. Pp. viii, 368. $35.00. 
GOD, COUNTRY AND THE SUPREME COURT. By 
James K. Fitzpatrick. Chicago, 11.: Regnery Books. 1985. 
Pp. X, 217. $18.95. 
Scott G. Knudson 2 
Professor Arthur Miller's most recent book is a collection of 
essays, all but one of which were first published in various legal 
periodicals from 1974 to 1984. Some of the topics are fairly narrow. 
Several, however, raise the most sweeping jurisprudential issues. In 
an introductory essay, Professor Miller suggests that constitutional 
jurisprudence is dominated by several myths-for example, the 
myth of separation of powers. More broadly, Miller argues that 
scholars should recognize that the Supreme Court is one of the 
political branches of the government, to be analyzed as such. 
In his central essay in the second chapter, Miller lays out his 
thesis that constitutional study should not focus simply on the Con-
stitution of 1787, but on three "constitutions" -political, economic, 
and corporate-which determine how America is organized and di-
rected. Miller carries this theme throughout the book, arguing in 
the third essay that we are moving from a constitution of powers to 
a constitution of control, under which modem technology will in-
crease the concentration of state power, resulting in an increased 
emphasis on state security and mass control measures. 
Miller asserts that orthodox constitutional thought is perme-
ated by a basic myth: that ours is a government of limited powers, 
as set forth in the Constitution. Borrowing a concept from Profes-
sor Michael Reisman, Professor Miller calls this myth the jurispru-
dential publique, the orthodox constitutional law of lawyers, judges 
and most scholars. The reality, he says, is ajurisprudence confiden-
tie/le, the private and largely unwritten set of rules that govern the 
I. Professor Emeritus, George Washington University National Law Center. 
2. Attorney, Latham & Watkins, Washington, D.C. 
